This article takes a comparative, empirical look at the practice of Irish neutrality during the World War II. It critiques a model of neutrality presented in a thesis on Irish neutrality called Unneutral Ireland, consisting of factors derived from an analysis of three states regarded as well-established European neutrals, Austria, Sweden and Switzerland that reflect the practice of neutrality. That model focused on the rights and duties of neutrality; the recognition of Ireland's status by belligerents and others; the disavowal of external help; and the freedom of decision and action. This present article focuses on the factors flowing from these latter obligations that are cited in an analysis of the practice of Irish neutrality, in the Unneutral thesis as proof of Ireland's 'unneutral' status, i.e. ideology; involvement in economic sanctions; partiality; the practice of Irish citizens joining the British army; and post-World
INTRODUCTION
A discourse produced by a number of academics, journalists and political elites claims that Irish neutrality is a 'myth', because the alleged inadequate practice of Irish neutrality during the Second World War vis-à-vis a conceptual model of neutrality renders Ireland 'unneutral'. This conclusion, that Ireland's neutrality does not exist 1 , is reflected in much of the academic discourse on Irish neutrality 2 and is echoed in the media discourse. 3 Discourses propounding the conceptual metaphors legation in Ireland to sign a book of condolences on Hitler's death 12 and the suggestion that de Valera was open to a deal on Northern Ireland in exchange for Ireland's neutrality during the war, 13 as well as post-World War II factors such as Ireland's membership of the EEC.
14 The argument of this article is that if the behaviours of Austria, Sweden and Switzerland were fairly evaluated, each of them would also be deemed 'unneutral' alongside Ireland, because each state violated these variables to an equal or greater extent. This conclusion gives rise to the following propositions: either the model of neutrality in the Unneutral thesis effectively defines neutrality out of existence, and is thus unhelpful in a fair and realistic evaluation of the practice of any state's neutrality; or the Irish practice of neutrality is not 'unneutral' by comparison with the above-named neutral states and Ireland was, in some respects, arguably more neutral than these others.
CRITIQUE OF THE MODEL
The first problem with the approach to formulating the model of variables used to evaluate Ireland's neutrality in the Unneutral thesis concerns tautology. The thesis takes Austria, Sweden and Switzerland as neutral states because they are "universally regarded as such", because they are "commonly identified as neutral…in the literature". 15 Using a common, inter-subjective belief that these states are neutral states to identify them as exemplars of a concept of neutrality, rather than arriving at this classification by analysing the practice of their neutrality, is a flawed basis for the formulation of the model. The Unneutral thesis does not evaluate both Ireland's neutrality and the practice of neutrality of these neutral states vis-à-vis its model of neutrality variables. There is no systematic analysis in the Unneutral thesis evaluating whether these neutral states adhered to the variables of neutrality. Only Ireland is evaluated against these variables, and is found wanting, to the extent that a dominant discourse is in operation that Ireland is 'unneutral'.
Garret FitzGerald also argues that Irish neutrality is a myth, on the same basis of a comparison with other neutral states, which he claims have had much more clear-cut concepts of neutrality than Ireland. 16 FitzGerald contends that it is at least questionable whether Ireland can properly be described as having been "neutral", because the scale of assistance given secretly to Britain was scarcely compatible with the concept of neutrality under International Law'.
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And it is not just the proponents of the 'unneutral' discourse in Ireland, but also "both great power blocs, and all the more, the Continental neutrals" 18 who have viewed Ireland's practice of neutrality as "sui generis". Thus, it is necessary to evaluate the neutrality of Sweden, Switzerland and Austria as well as that of Ireland against those variables of the model, to establish whether Irish neutrality really 12 This 'book of condolences' myth is part of mainstream public discourse that will be discussed later. A variation on this myth is also a significant part of academic anti-neutrality discourses, the difference being that the academic discourse does not materialise the myth in the form of a book of condolences, and many acknowledge that de Valera visited the home of the German Representative in Ireland, although all maintain that de Valera went to pay 'condolences': O'Halpin is one of the few academics who claim that de Valera went to the legation; The passages of text cited as the basis of the above academics' analyses of the nature of the visit refer only to an act of courtesy, not a call of condolence. In this and the other primary source (a Dáil statement) relied on by the above academics, 'courtesy', not 'condolence', was the self-professed purpose of de Valera's visit. The 'courtesy' afforded to Hempel by de Valera in the form of an offer of asylum and the details of what actually took place when de Valera called on Hempel -will also be discussed in detail later. 13 is all that different from the neutrality practised by European neutral states during and after the Second World War.
The second problem with how the Unneutral thesis evaluated Ireland's neutrality concerns the proposition that if each of those neutral states violated many elements of the thesis's model of neutrality, they would also be deemed 'unneutral'. The approach of evaluating the failures of each state on a 'sortal' rather than a 'scalar' basis effectively defines neutrality out of existence. The problem is that there is no indication of a hierarchy of the variables in the model, of which variables are fundamental to the concept of neutrality and which variables are auxiliary. Is it possible to violate auxiliary elements of neutrality and still be considered a neutral state? Or is it the case that a violation of just one variable of the model renders a state 'unneutral'? Does a state have to violate all of the variables to be deemed 'unneutral'? This is not made clear. Although it is possible to argue for a scalar concept of neutrality that allows violations of some variables in the model, the specification of such conditions would be political and contested. This issue pervades the following comparative analysis of European neutral states' policies and practices of neutrality.
Benevolence and Concessions
Ireland did give assistance to Britain during the war in terms of shipping, emigration and aviation policy 19 ; for example, de Valera came up with "an ingenious plan to help Britain while at the same time preserving the appearance of strict neutrality". 20 Once the Irish authorities located a submarine, information on its whereabouts would be radioed "to the world". 21 This would not be of assistance to the Germans because they were too far from Ireland to use the information, but Britain could take action. 22 However, most of the actions were mutually beneficial. It was out of a determination to remain neutral that De Valera denied the British the cooperation from Ireland they wanted most:
23 the return of the Treaty Ports to British hands, and as a result, Irish neutrality was never legally compromised. Bill McSweeney reasoned that Ireland's "defence was backed up by some ostentatious displays of military impartiality and other, less public, concessions to the Allied cause which were deemed necessary to pacify an outraged Westminster government". 24 Arguably, Salmon and FitzGerald's point about Ireland's alleged lack of adherence to the international law of neutrality could apply to all of the neutral states, not just Ireland. As Risto Pentillä explains, the World Wars shattered the idea of strict, impartial neutrality because those who were able to stay out of the war (many neutral states were invaded) had to compromise their neutrality in economic and military terms in favour of the stronger belligerent side. Citing the case of Sweden, which allowed the transport of German troops through its territory, he argues that such states were legally non-belligerent rather than neutral, concluding, however, that, "because of these concessions, Sweden managed to stay out of the war even if it broke legal rules concerning neutrality". 25 Constance Howard cites another example in the case of the Swiss, who also made concessions to the Axis side: "while the Swiss were determined to maintain their political independence and to defend their neutrality, the Government were obliged to make a number of concessions to Germany and Italy". 26 Thus, Rodrick Ogley surmises, "Sweden and Switzerland, like other successful neutrals, had to make concessions, in their case, largely to the Axis powers". 27 Ogley argues, the fact that Sweden and Switzerland survived at all as neutrals in the Second World War says much for their diplomatic skill. Their problem, essentially, was to concede what had to be conceded to Axis powers, and no more, while making clear that they would fight against any wholesale assault on their independence. 28 Ogley concludes that "only Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland of the European States, preserved their neutrality throughout the war". 29 Thus, Ireland is included in the bracket of successful European neutral states in his analysis. It also appears that Ireland did not have to make as severe concessions as other European neutrals -such as facilitating the transportation of British or German troops, as some other neutrals did -thus casting doubt over the argument made by Salmon and FitzGerald that Ireland's neutrality is a myth because it was of a 'less clear-cut' type than that of Sweden or Switzerland.
Impartiality and disavowal of external help
Impartiality is a property of neutrality that Salmon finds lacking in the exercise of Irish neutrality: he argues "partiality to one side or the other is not simply to be added up and judged acceptable if the score comes out evenly at the bottom. There can be little doubt that the Irish engaged in unneutral acts and in partial behaviour". 30 Dwyer recounts that de Valera was cautious in providing measures that might appear to prove beneficial to one side, i.e. the British, more than the other side, and he had made changes to an exclusion order to include aircrafts and ships because, "if the policy were directed against U-boats alone, critics would charge that it was entirely anti-German". 31 Salmon also argues that an estimated forty thousand Irishmen from the Republic fighting in the British army "did infringe neutrality by its partiality". 32 This argument, however, runs contrary to the legal concept of neutrality, for example, the Swiss Doctrine of neutrality provides that neutrality is not conducted by private individuals. Therefore in a neutral country there is freedom of the press, and freedom to join an army if an individual so wishes. 33 Furthermore, Salmon raises the question of whether involvement in the EEC and EPC is incompatible with impartiality, especially as Ireland has participated, along with other Community members, in imposing sanctions against various states on various occasions. Yet, the 1993 Swiss Federal Council report concluded "the law of neutrality does not render neutrality and participation in economic sanctions fundamentally incompatible". 34 Salmon makes a number of other arguments and suggests a number of incidents, actions, decisions and attitudes concerning talks, supplies, aid, trade, due diligence, disavowal of help and ideology that, he argues, means that Ireland was 'unneutral'. Each of these points will be examined in detail below and a comparison made with the other European neutral states to establish whether Ireland has failed to live up to the same standards of these 'clear-cut', 'genuine', 'established' neutral states.
Salmon argues that Ireland was unneutral during World War II on the basis of Irish participation in talks about a defence alliance. He claims that "a number of talks with the British showed a clear partiality as regards disavowal of external help", 35 although there are assumptions underlying this claim. 36 What of the behaviour of the other neutrals, such as Sweden and Norway? Those two neutral states also engaged in similar discussions, with some analysts claiming that Sweden had "made secret preparations for co-operating with the West in the event of Soviet aggression and neutrality failing". 37 Moreover, neutral Norway (at least up until the time the Nazis intervened to pre- Nevertheless, Salmon continues, the real question is whether the Irish reservation was sufficient to save their policy of neutrality. Preparations for and expectations of help certainly ran counter to the principles underpinning a policy 'for neutrality', as followed by Austria, Sweden and Switzerland.
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Based on the evidence of the analysis so far, Irish neutrality is no different, no less 'neutral' than that of Austria, Sweden and Finland, Salmon's paragon neutral states. Thus, either Ireland is neutral because she compares well, or none of the other states are neutral and the model in the 'Unneutral' thesis has effectively defined the concept out of existence. De Valera had said in the Dáil on 19 th May 1937 that he was willing to accept assistance from the British, "provided it was clear that the whole object of it was to maintain the inviolability of our territory"; 42 in other words, so that the state and its independence could be protected. The then UK Minister for Health in the wartime Cabinet, Malcolm MacDonald, was sent to Dublin to try to persuade de Valera to allow British troops into Ireland to take over the ports -his advice was given "principally in the interests of Éire in itself". 43 Fisk surmises, "MacDonald must have realized that this was less than the truth; in her greatest moment of peril since Napoleon planned an invasion across the Channel, Britain was not offering her troops to Éire for de Valera's benefit". In his response to each of the British proposals, de Valera emphatically rejected any possibility of 'Éire' abandoning her neutrality. 44 The key point is that de Valera rejected the proposals of external help offered by the British out of a concern to preserve neutrality and the state.
Due diligence and defence resources
Salmon argues, it is difficult to say categorically what constitutes sufficient resources, but at sea and air the Irish clearly did not have 'enough', since they were incapable of preventing invasions into territorial waters and airspace, or violations of their neutrality. Their relative defencelessness meant that on occasion they did bend…with respect to 'due diligence' the Irish clearly defaulted, particularly in the air and at sea. The Irish objective was simply to avoid participation in the war. That is not neutrality. Before going into the detail of the "due diligence" accusation, it is worth pointing out, in reference to the last argument, that it is clear from this analysis that the other neutral states also had only one goal in mind -to avoid participating in the war -and this goal was pursued at the expense of many legal rules of neutrality. If Ireland is 'unneutral' on this basis, then all of the other states in this present analysis must also be 'unneutral'.
Fisk reasons that
accidental encroachments into Irish territorial waters and a flood of refugees from Britain were the natural burdens of neutrality and de Valera could not have been surprised by these events. Éire was the only British dominion to choose neutrality -the rest of the Commonwealth followed Chamberlain's lead by declaring war on Germany. 46 Salmon argues that airspace violations rendered Ireland unneutral, however, it is also the case that other European neutrals also suffered airspace violations, many of them committed by the British. Howard recounts the Swiss experience of airspace violations:
since the summer of 1940, however, British bombers had repeatedly crossed Swiss territory on their way to attack north Italian towns and, in spite of repeated protests from the Swiss Government, this violation of Swiss air by British aviators continued. The Italians complained that Swiss illumination gave an unfair advantage to British bomber crews as it helped them to find their targets in northern Italy. 47 Norway also experienced airspace violations: Hicks describes how there were minor violations of Norwegian neutrality during this period, in the shape of flights by belligerent aircraft over Norwegian territory. Such incidents were always followed by prompt Norwegian protests to the offending Power when it was possible to identify the trespassing aircraft.
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And in the post-war period, Schlesinger maintains that although lip service was paid to Austria's armed neutrality, "…the words are rarely converted into expenditures and law". 49 Air defence was a particular weak spot: Austria's "effective air defense has been virtually non-existent", to the point that Austria was forced to protest to the United States over violations of its airspace during the Near East crisis. 50 Salmon further assesses, on land the situation was somewhat different, since throughout the duration the land area of the twenty-six counties remained inviolate. There was perhaps an element of deterrence…Certainly the Irish could have made wholesale occupation unprofitable. 51 De Valera's determination for the state to remain inviolate will be dealt with below, in relation to defence resources and threats of invasion from Britain. The Swiss were in much the same situation as Ireland, with an aggressive, hostile belligerent as a near neighbour in Germany, but they managed to stay out of the war despite similar threats of invasion:
In 1943 the Government had real grounds for fear that German threats might indeed be 46 translated into action. Hitherto, also, although Hitler had been greatly irked by Switzerland's continued independence and neutrality, the advantages which would have accrued from the invasion and conquest of Switzerland had been clearly outweighed by the drawbacks. The Germans were aware that any attack would be strongly resisted by the Swiss. 52 The Irish government itself acknowledged that neutrality meant limited warfare with all belligerents. As Frank Aiken, the minister for the 'Coordination of Defensive Measures' said on 23 January 1940, "in the modern total warfare it [neutrality] is not a condition of peace with both belligerents, but rather a condition of limited warfare with both…". 53 De Valera added, neutrality if you are sincere about it means you will have to fight for your life against one side or the other -which ever attacks you first. Neutrality is not a cowardly policy if you really mean to defend yourself if attacked. Other nations have not gone crusading until they were attacked.
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Defence expenditure and "costs of attack"
Although, as mentioned earlier, Salmon admits, "it is difficult to say categorically what constitutes sufficient resources", 55 he does confirm that, "neutrals do, however, need the ability to deter by making the costs of attack too high, relatively, for the belligerent". 56 Salmon claims that the Irish position was undermined by de Valera's recognition that Ireland was a small state and the equipment and arms required in modern wars were beyond a small state. 57 These issues were also acknowledged by the small neutral states in mainland Europe. The notion that a certain level of arms means that a defence is 100% effective is a (neo)realist myth; no defence can be 100% effective and the Swedes and other World War II neutrals knew their defence limits too. The important fact is that de Valera pledged that Ireland would fight any incursion from any side, and the costs of attack were made high. This was acknowledged by both the Germans and the British.
In January 1938 one of the questions put to the British chief of staff's sub-committees included a question as to whether the importance of the Irish ports was so great as to warrant military operations to regain possession of them. The reply indicated that this would require a campaign of Gallipoli proportions if it were carried out in the face of opposition. 58 Duggan recalls de Valera's contingency plans in 1938 that if Britain were to be an aggressor, "Ireland would make such aggression as costly as possible for Britain".
59 O'Halpin also admits that 'the evident determination of the Irish to resist any invader, however briefly, undoubtedly had some influence on British thinking'. 60 He argues, 'it can also fairly be said that, by as early as the spring of 1941, the defence forces were sufficiently well organised to provide sustained resistance to British action'. 61 On 14 December 1941 Hempel confirmed de Valera's reiterated determination to defend Irish neutrality....'not an inch' of Irish territory was for sale. 62 It is worth noting that the strategy of other neutral states, such as Austria, was also based on the strategy of "the highest possible price of entry", with relatively low levels of defence expenditure.
63 Thus, de Valera had shown comparatively sufficient due diligence and defence resource preparations to make the perceived costs of occupation too high for belligerents, an achievement he shared with the other neutral states. 52 Howard, 'Switzerland', 151. 53 What Salmon's analysis (in particular the charge regarding Ireland's lack of arms) fails to acknowledge sufficiently is the British and American refusals of de Valera's requests for arms. 64 Duggan recalls, "it was difficult if not impossible in the circumstances to procure weapons. Britain was obstructive; the US was unco-operative. ...Still the realisation that the Irish would resist with whatever weapons they had was a bottom line deterrent: there was a long tradition of taking the pikes down from the thatch". 65 Dwyer also documents the almost vicious responses to de Valera's pleas for arms from the Allied sides, coupled with the belligerents' threats to invade Ireland given the poor defence capabilities of the army: "with the British, the American President stymied every suggestion to supply additional arms to the Irish army".
66 O'Halpin also notes that 'efforts to secure arms in the United States also fell on deaf ears, primarily because of Roosevelt's hostility to Irish neutrality'.
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And David Gray, the United States representative in Dublin during the war years and a confidant of the American President (Gray was also related to Eleanor Roosevelt by marriage to her aunt), made the threat from the Third Reich seem remote by comparison: "Allied troops were already poised on Irish soil and Gray had an insensitive amateur's appetite for action". 68 Fisk also recounts that de Valera's persistent, occasionally frantic quest for weapons was to be a consistent theme of Irish foreign policy over the coming years, a search that was principally directed towards the belligerent powers and which was thus always rewarded by demands which would -if mettotally compromise Éire's neutrality. In return for guns, the British wanted the use of the Treaty ports, the Americans wanted Irish participation in the war, and the Germans -less ambitious because there was little else to be gained -wanted a closer relationship between Dublin and Berlin. Denuded of weapons, Éire's refusal to participate in the war was no longer just an assertion of sovereignty; from now on, the policy had to prove successful in keeping Éire out of the war.
69

Supplies, trade and economic dependence
Because there were exchanges of food for military supplies across the Northern Ireland border, a lack of a 'strategic reserve' and a dependence on other countries' shipping for imports of wheat, maize, petroleum and bulk cargoes, Salmon claims "third parties" saw room for influence and manoeuvre, and doubted the credibility of Irish neutrality. 70 On the other hand, Fisk regards de Valera's prioritizing of food supplies and external trade, followed by censorship, counterespionage and coastwatching, over military measures and air-raid precautions as an authentic policy of neutrality, the desire to maintain the country's commercial life and safeguard its political integrity from external pressures, while taking only minimum defence precautions on the grounds that neutrality -if strictly adhered to -would obviate the need for enormous military expenditure.
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In fact, de Valera turned down trade agreements with Britain in order to safeguard Irish neutrality:
in November the war cabinet was told that Éire had rejected the storage and trans-shipment proposals as being incompatible with neutrality and from fears that they would provoke German attacks on the ports if not on the country as a whole. Ireland's refusal of the trade agreement may have left her vulnerable to the British economic pressure, but the refusal also sealed off a potential serious breach in Ireland's neutrality and nothing was more important for de Valera.
Although Salmon is right to point out that Ireland was vulnerable, if this vulnerability renders Ireland 'unneutral', then Salmon must retract his understanding of Switzerland, Sweden and others as neutral, because those states experienced similar difficulties. Howard points out that although the Swiss, with the exception of a minority of fanatics and defeatists, were resolved to maintain their political independence, economically they were obliged to align themselves much more closely with Hitler's Europe. 73 After the fall of France, Switzerland was economically at the mercy of the Axis, which controlled practically all ways in and out of Switzerland. In a trade agreement reached on 9 August 1940, Germany undertook to supply her with certain quantities of raw materials, of which the most vital were coal and iron. In return, Swiss industry was to supply Germany with goods required for her war effort. 74 The Swiss neutrality doctrine states that the neutral country is entitled to trade with belligerents; the neutral country has merely to submit to certain encroachments by the belligerents, e.g. a blockade. According to the 1954 Swiss Ministry doctrine, "the rules adopted by Switzerland during the last war of maintaining the normal level and an adequate consideration in trade were voluntarily elected economic principles of its own".
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Norway had to deal with a similar situation: "Norway continued to maintain commercial relations with both belligerents -though this to a decreasing extent, and at the price of incurring both Germany and Franco-British displeasure". 76 It is held that Swedish neutrality during World War Two was compromised by its trade with Nazi Germany 77 , whilst Austria's leading trade partners were Germany and Italy. 78 The point is that although there is some support for Salmon's claims that Ireland was non-belligerent in the Second World War because of dependent trade relations or concessions made or assistance given, this analysis shows that Salmon must withdraw his definition of Switzerland and Sweden as being neutral, and to re-brand those states as non-belligerent, because those states failed the same criteria more severely than Ireland is alleged to have failed them. Finally, other academics have argued that the analyses painting a picture of Ireland during the war as simply a British satellite, entirely dependent for national survival on Britain's good will, is not accurate; as O'Halpin contends, 'even in the spheres of trade and commerce, it is more accurate to characterise the relationship as one of interdependence'.
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"Non-belligerency" and official belligerent acknowledgement of Irish neutrality
Salmon claims that because the British didn't guarantee not to invade Ireland and refused to officially recognise Ireland as a neutral state, Irish neutrality was not possible. He argues, "neutrality does not come into existence until recognized by both belligerents", 80 and therefore Ireland was 'unneutral'; he does, however, concede that "on occasion there was a certain apparent de facto recognition of the Irish position". 81 It is notable that Hitler did not guarantee not to invade Switzerland, 82 and yet Salmon regards Switzerland as neutral.
The British always refused to acknowledge Ireland's neutrality and preferred to use the term 'non-belligerency', because Ireland was still a member of the Commonwealth. As Fisk recounts, a formal recognition of Éire's neutrality presented a serious difficulty, said Eden 83 , because 'we do not want formally to recognize Éire as neutral while Éire remains a member of the British Commonwealth'. This would surrender the 'constitutional theory of the indivisibility of the Crown'. 84 73 Howard, 'Switzerland', 147-8. 74 Howard, 'Switzerland', 147-8. 75 Duggan's account of this period states, the [German] Envoy had reported Allied pressure to change the Irish neutrality posture to a stance of technical nonbelligerency, which would be designed, he said, to permit the Allies to use the ports". 85 Therefore, regardless of the language the British government used because of political considerations, it was recognised by both the British and German sides that Ireland was indeed 'neutral', and this legal, official stance could only turn into "non-belligerency" if troops were allowed in (as in the example of Sweden cited by Pentillä above).
Britain's official view of Ireland's status emerged during times when the British government tried to persuade the Irish government to allow British soldiers into Ireland. MacDonald offered, we would be content for Éire to remain non-belligerent if she invited our ships into her ports and our troops and aeroplanes into her territory to increase her security against the fate which had befallen neutral Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg. 86 Whereas MacDonald avoided the word 'neutrality' throughout these meetings, 87 in fact there was 'official British' recognition of Ireland's neutral status in various forums, although many were offrecord.
There are several examples of this "certain apparent de facto recognition of " 88 Ireland's neutrality by Britain. For example, Duff Cooper, the UK Minister for Information, made a speech in May 1941 in which he had been rash enough to state that however deeply and disastrously Britain suffered from Irish neutrality, 'we respect the independence of Éire and allow them to remain neutral while we are fighting for our lives. That shows Great Britain abides by her word'. 89 Fisk also tells us that when Hugh Dalton, the president of the British Board of Trade, told the House of Commons that 'in view of her neutrality, Éire cannot expect the same considerations as those who are at war with the common enemy', the Irish Department of Supplies not unnaturally concluded that this 'quite clearly indicates that because of our neutrality we are being subjected to a "squeeze"'. 90 In a War Cabinet memorandum, Viscount Cranbourne, the UK Dominions Secretary from 1940-2, described life in "Southern Ireland" as very uncomfortable, and stated that the discomfort "is a direct result of her neutrality". 91 When Cranbourne informed Churchill of a request for arms from de Valera in a cover note attached to a dispatch from Maffey, Churchill replied, no attempt should be made to conceal from Mr de Valera the depth and intensity of feeling against the policy of Irish neutrality. We have tolerated and acquiesced in it, but juridically we have never recognized that Southern Ireland is an independent Sovereign State, and she herself has repudiated Dominion Status. Her international status is undefined and anomalous. 92 The issue behind British refusal to officially acknowledge Ireland's neutrality was largely inspired by Churchill's imperialist attitude towards Ireland. Fisk reports, there is, throughout Churchill's writing and speeches at this period, an ill-concealed impatience with the Irish that sometimes turns into contempt. Above all, there was his notion that by rejecting the Oath of Allegiance, de Valera's Ireland might somehow legally cease to exist. It was a very disturbing idea to have been gestating in the mind of a future British Prime Minister.
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At the time described by Fisk, Churchill, still smarting over the Anglo-Irish rapprochement of 1938 [Chamberlain's decision to hand the Treaty Ports back to de Valera]…also brought with him to the Admiralty his profound distrust of de Valera's young state….Here, clearly, would be no friend of a neutral Éire. So it was to turn out, for as Britain went to war against Germany, Churchill's contempt for Éire's political status surfaced almost at once. Only two days after the British declaration of war, he ordered the Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord, to compile a special report 'upon the questions arising from the so-called neutrality of the so-called Éire'. 94 On foot of this request, Sir William Malkin, the UK Foreign Office Legal Advisor, wrote a ten-page report (it was classified top secret and was never seen by de Valera) on the legal aspects of Irish neutrality and the Treaty ports, which amounted to 'as blunt an acknowledgement of Éire's juridical right to remain neutral as had yet come from a British Government official'. Malkin went on to define the complexities of Irish neutrality in a way that morally precluded any British action against Éire. 95 Anthony Eden added to the report by hand: I fear that it becomes every day clearer that it is scarcely possible for "Dev" to square neutrality with the grant of the facilities for which the Admiralty ask. And at least 80% of the Irish people favour neutrality. Altogether a pretty problem.
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Churchill responded to the paper in a way that revealed the extent of Churchill's disturbing obsession about Ireland: he did not just throw doubt on the international validity of Irish neutrality. He was questioning Éire's very right to exist as a separate and independent state 97 ....seventeen months later, Churchill had become possessed of the idea that Éire had no international rights at all. 98 Thus, the refusal by 'Britain' to recognise the neutrality of Ireland was in effect, Churchill's refusal to recognise Ireland as a sovereign state, and this was the real dynamic behind Salmon's argument that the British never simply accepted the 1939 Irish aide-mémoire and throughout the war refused to recognize the Irish position formally. Moreover, there was lacking not only a guarantee of respect for Irish neutrality but also a guarantee not to invade Irish territory: this latter omission was quite deliberate. 
Protective umbrella and "relying on Britain"
Salmon's thesis claims that "the Irish relied on a protective umbrella supplied by the British" 101 and that "during the war there was no consistent Irish disavowal of external help…there still remained a belief in the protective umbrella". 102 Salmon is employing a classic (neo)realist myth in his use of the concept of a protective umbrella to argue that Ireland is 'unneutral'. His argument is feasible in a different sense, in terms of seeking help to prevent an attack, as a speech by de Valera on 5 October 1943 illustrates. On that occasion, the taoiseach reasserted in tones reminiscent of a 1940 speech recalled earlier, that if Ireland were attacked by one side, Ireland would seek aid from the other. In this sense, the notion of a protective umbrella applies equally to the other major belligerent in the War, Germany, as it does to Britain. Regardless, as Duggan points out, "this did not indicate any overt change in maintaining the policy of neutrality". 103 Salmon's argument may also be resting on the notion that the Germans would have to overcome Britain before launching an invasion of Ireland, but that argument does not hold either, given the inability of the British to defend Belfast and the indications of German plans to occupy Ireland directly. 
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The validity of "the Irish" relying on Salmon's (neo)realist concept of a British protective umbrella is undermined by the fact that "de Valera was never able to rule out the possibility of British attack".
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Throughout the War, de Valera did not know which side was going to be the first to launch an invasion of Ireland and he had to make plans to tackle both the Germans and the British, and also the Americans. Fisk reports that in June 1944 "Éire thought she might be invaded by American troops". 111 Duggan recounts that, Hempel passed on the following British secret service report: in their judgement the Irish army was very good, in spite of a shortage of armament; that factor meant that a large force of, say, 100,000 men would be required for a quick occupation of Ireland" 112 and that Hempel felt a British attack had to be reckoned with 113 -"de Valera did not exaggerate when he stressed the threat from both sides". 114 Fisk confirms that, "the Irish Government anticipated not only an invasion but an occupation of large parts of Éire by British or German troops.
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Ideological impartiality
Salmon quotes FitzGerald who said in 1980, "there really isn't such a thing as neutrality today: we are part of Western Europe and our interests coincide with theirs" 116 and he argues the fact that Ireland's profession of itself as not neutral between ideologies (i.e. between Western values and Communism) violates neutrality. However, the other neutral states also declared they were part of Western Europe and shared the associated values. Hakovirta states "the neutrals identify themselves ideologically with the West".
117 Schlesinger notes Austrian foreign policy's general identification with the West as a value system 118 with significant economic and cultural relations with Germany 119 and that Austria's neutrality was a consequence of a Soviet-Austrian understanding.
120 Furthermore, Schlesinger points to an analyst who declared that Austria and Switzerland, as two 'alpine neutrals', had been "more Western than the West". 121 Keatinge notes that Finland has a consideration for the Soviet Union, mirroring Ireland's consideration for the United States, and argues that Sweden and Switzerland are "essentially oriented to the west".
122 Andrén clarifies this in more detail;
Sweden has never sought to assume a neatly balanced position in all major respects between the superpowers or between the power blocs. The Swedish policy of neutrality is related only to security, not to ideology, economic relations, or other aspects of international affairs. Sweden has repeatedly and emphatically rejected the idea of ideological neutrality.
ideologically close to one of the belligerents. Nor does it demand ideological impartiality even during a war". 124 He argues that impartiality is not with respect to ideology or culture, but the likely consequences of ideology, such as trade, communication links and the possibility of recruitment and propaganda.
Northern Ireland
There were other issues alleged to violate or vilify Irish neutrality that continue to crop up in the national public discourse that are worth examining: specifically, the allegations regarding a deal offered by the British government on Northern Ireland and the matter of de Valera offering condolences on Hitler's death. After the bombing of Pearl Harbour, Churchill sent a telegram to de Valera, which the latter understood to be a coded offer of a united Ireland in return for the abandonment of neutrality. It was apparently one of a large number of euphoric telegrams which Churchill had fired off to all corners of the globe in the wake of America's entry to the war. De Valera's habitual reserve stood him in good stead at that moment: neither then nor later did he seriously entertain Churchill's offer…in truth, he had his mind made up on his preference for neutrality. 125 Fisk also shows that even if a united Ireland came about through the negotiations proposed by the British government, de Valera would not have allowed Ireland to join the war. He describes how Mulcahy asked de Valera five days after the meeting with MacDonald, "if he would be prepared in…an All-Ireland Parliament to advocate and support going into the war against Germany. And de Valera 'stated that he would not'". 126 De Valera surmised, "we are, of course, aware that the policy of neutrality has its dangers, but, on the other hand, departure from it would involve us in dangers greater still". 127 It was Craigavon (the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland) who implied in public that the initiative for Irish unity in return for the abandonment of the neutrality policy had come not from the British but from de Valera.
128
Condolences
Mansergh recounts, "the rigid formalistic adherence to the letter of neutrality, which found significant expression on many occasions, caused much misunderstanding of Éire's position even among the members of the united nations most friendly to her". 129 One such occasion concerns de Valera's "formal call of condolence on the German Minister on 3 May 1945" after the end of the war. 130 This incident is a central part of the anti-neutrality discourse of the past 35 years and is continually cited in the context of arguments that seek to undermine positive adherence to Irish neutrality by members of the Irish public (particularly those who have vetoed EU treaties in the 2001 Nice Treaty referendum and 2008 Lisbon Treaty referendum in an attempt to protect Irish neutrality). Discourse theorists are concerned with looking at 'play of practice': in particular, the efforts of agents to articulate and rearticulate a particular version of an event so that it will become sedimented as a 'regime of truth', pointing to a singular 'common sense' policy practice. 131 They are also concerned with examining the genealogy of a dominant discourse and with making space for the subjugated alternative than the dominant discourse, thus to make space for other logical policy avenues to the dominant one.
132 This article will now focus on these efforts to stabilize and fix particular meanings of neutrality and will critique the genealogy of the 'book of condolences' myth. This 'book of condolences' myth is widespread: it is part of mainstream publicly-available accounts of Irish neutrality. For example, it appears in the first and highest ranked article in a Google search on "Irish neutrality"
133 ; it arises in tourist guides' talks; 134 it is cited by secondary school students of history;
135 it is a constant in public and political discourse in Ireland; 136 and it is part of media discourse on Irish neutrality abroad. 137 Its ubiquity is connected to the activities of a significant number of anti-neutrality academics, politicians and journalists, such as Salmon, FitzGerald, Roberts, Girvin and Collins, who continue to publicize and promote the story that de Valera went to the German Legation in order to sign a book of condolences and/or to sympathize over the death of Hitler.
There are three core untruths in this collection of discourses: But what is the evidence upon which to base these three arguments, and a further argument that the claims made in the discourses above regarding the location of the meeting and indeed, the purpose of it, are undoubtedly connected to negative attitudes towards Irish neutrality and a desire to fulfil alternative security and defence policy ambitions? John P. Duggan's account of the visit appears to be the only historical (and more importantly, referenced) account that is based on independent, primary evidence. According to Duggan, who personally interviewed Hempel's wife in Ireland, "it took Frau Hempel to put the record straight as to the location of the visit. The Taoiseach had visited Hempel's home rather than the legation".
139 Was the purpose of de Valera's visit to sign a book of condolences? According to Duggan's account, de Valera paid a visit out of consideration for Hempel 140 -"the German minister, who deduced his mission as being the preservation of Irish neutrality", 141 who was "a great favourite of Dev's because he had fought against any German infringement of Irish neutrality" -and because it was the right thing to do.
142 His attitude to "the displaced German diplomat" was "charitable and understanding. He granted asylum to him and his family". 143 De Valera defended his decision to grant Hempel asylum against British and American pressure to do otherwise.
that it was important that it should never be inferred that these formal acts imply the passing of judgements, good or bad, on the Third Reich. He was quite sure that he had acted correctly and wisely 162 and concludes his analysis by noting "[t]he Hempels were grateful for de Valera's consideration and helping hand. He was indeed a friend in need". 163 The 'book of condolences'/'condolences' myth is undoubtedly widespread and consistently repeated, although, tellingly, this genealogical analysis shows that none of the primary sources relied on by the historians citing the few words from de Valera referring to the visit involve 'condolences'. Girvin titled the first chapter of his account of Irish neutrality "Condolences on Hitler's Death", indicating a remarkable devotion of space and priority to the event given the scope of the history of Irish neutrality. This indicates a rather obvious anti-neutrality political position, one that the author acknowledges in the preface to his book: "I was an active proponent of European integration, believing that Ireland should join NATO..". 164 The same pattern is found in relation to Garret FitzGerald, who argued that "military neutrality is immoral" and initiated and carried on a series of columns in the Irish Independent advocating Irish membership of NATO. 165 Later, as Ireland's minister for foreign affairs, FitzGerald ensured the perpetuity of the condolences story by passing it on to other EC Foreign Ministers. 166 The debate continues in recent historical texts, but what this analysis seeks to highlight is that history is political, particularly the history of Irish neutrality. In the absence of readers' own independent investigations of the primary sources referenced by the above academics, whose interpretation of the event would the reader choose to believe? Current historians and academics who faithfully maintain the condolences discourse, although some of whom have expressed their personal hatred of Irish neutrality? Or the past generation of politicians and diplomats, who were agents with political and personal agendas towards neutrality, such as the Germans who wanted to maintain it and the Americans and British who wanted to end it? For discourse theorists, it is important to offer the 'subjugated' knowledge and interpretation of an event, particularly in the face of unrelenting repetitions of myths involving manipulation of the truth, ignorance of primary evidence and disregard of political context due to an underlying agenda; evidence and context that can provide an alternative and arguably more authentic interpretation of an event.
EEC membership
Salmon argues that the act of joining the EEC in 1973 cast doubt on the principle of Irish neutrality because Ireland "accepted…the political objectives of the Community, including political unification and a European identity…and the need ultimately to partake in Community defence". 167 Twelve years after the initial application, the EEC agreed to accept Ireland as a member, and the Irish government put the proposal to the people through a referendum. The 1972 public debate on EEC membership concentrated on the economic implications of membership 168 and although the question of the possible political consequences was raised, the consequences were not explored in any depth. 169 The government took the line that defence co-operation was a consequence and not a pre-condition of political union, and that it would only arise when economic integration was complete. In the campaign in the run-up to the 1972 referendum, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael reiterated the line that there was no 162 Duggan, Neutral Ireland, 242. 163 Duggan, Neutral Ireland, 244. 164 Girvin, The Emergency, x. Notably, Girvin relates that de Valera went with Joseph Walshe, who he notes was a friend of Hempel's (see The Emergency, 5), but he ignores the significance of this point, in that it could further indicate that the purpose of the visit was of a personal nature. Furthermore, although Girvin asks the question of why de Valera went to see Hempel, his chapter does not reference what was considered as 'the standard work' (see Wills, That Neutral Island, 428) , in his analysis of the event: Duggan's 1985 book on Ireland and the Third Reich. Thus, Girvin ignores the only referenced, primary account of the event indicating that de Valera went to the home of Hempels to assure them they would be provided with asylum and out of courtesy to the diplomat who supported Irish neutrality when others would not. 165 threat to Irish neutrality, and that, in any case, neutrality was accidental, ad hoc, temporary and conditional. 170 The then Taoiseach and leader of Fianna Fáil, Jack Lynch, said Ireland would defend others in the Community and that Ireland had no traditional policy of neutrality like Sweden and Switzerland, and nor did Ireland's neutrality compare with Austria's declaration of permanent neutrality. 171 The Labour Party, traditionally a defender of Irish neutrality, was the only large political party to campaign against membership. As Salmon points out, Successive government declarations did not help to clarify the issue: they emphasised the legal position when referring to neutrality, but Irish moral and political obligations when referring to Community commitment. A distinction was drawn between current and future commitments, and between the Community and an alliance. 172 However, Salmon goes on to argue that this acceptance was the position not only at the elite level: underneath these statements lay a public recognition and acceptance that at some time in the future, and conditional upon certain developments, Ireland would join in the defence of the Community. The problem arose from a reluctance to accept the corollary, namely that such a position involved the abandonment of neutrality. 173 This is a rather confident statement regarding the state of public opinion given that Salmon does not consider public opinion as a substantive concern in his analysis of Irish neutrality and does not cite any primary evidence in support of this claim.
Is Salmon's thesis that the Irish people accepted that Ireland would take up membership of a European military alliance true? With regard to public opinion at that time, other perspectives imply there is no case to answer, because in the public debate over Irish membership any incompatibility of these goals [of EU membership and neutrality] did not appear to have been pressed home to the Irish public. 174 Keatinge argues the decisive vote of the electorate in favour of membership of the European Community is explained by the quantifiable expectations of economic gain rather than by views, one way or another, on neutrality. 175 "the dismissive attitude of the Irish proponents of EEC membership to the possibility of Ireland's entanglement within the political and military designs of the European Communities". 179 Hakovirta also opines that the question of neutrality was never very important in the arguments presented by the Irish government for EC membership, or even in the Irish EC debate in general. It was basically seen as a limited question of non-membership in military alliances. The government argued that membership of the EC was something quite different from that. 180 
CONCLUSION
Salmon's conclusion that Ireland's neutrality does not exist 181 has spread into and seemingly taken root in the mainstream academic discourse on Irish neutrality, and is echoed in the media discourse. The approach Salmon has taken in evaluating a state's neutrality according to a legalistic, prescriptive, sortal definition has effectively defined neutrality out of existence, because any empirical evaluation of a state's neutrality shows discrepancies between theoretical and legal prescriptions and state practices. The comparative analysis undertaken in this article demonstrates the failure of all neutral states to fulfil the criteria of neutrality proposed in the "Unneutral Ireland" thesis. The assertion by many academics that Ireland's neutrality is questionable because it does not mirror the clarity of the concept reflected in the practice of other European neutral states is therefore falsified through this comparative analysis. Tonra summarises the 'unneutral' thesis as one in which Ireland's "neutrality has been dismissed as an almost adolescent effort to distinguish the state from its ancient enemy (Salmon, 1989 )". 182 Arguably the Unneutral thesis's effort to understand and give a fair account of Irish neutrality falls short in a comparative, empirical context. Neutrality is a concept needing evaluation in relation to the particular time in which it exists and the situation thereof. Jessup and Deak illustrate this point:
it may be well to suggest a distinction between the factors contributing to the creation of these rules of the international law of neutrality rights and the factors conditioning their application. It is apparent that economic necessities and opportunities and political alignments moved the states of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to embrace and advocate particular rules. But the rules having once come into vogue often developed into a servant stronger than the master. The rules became part of the factual situation which statesmen had to take into account in shaping their policies from time to time. This was true because the rules were themselves the reflection of economic and political realities. 183 Thus, many empirical differences in the conduct of neutrality are argued to legitimately exist, and are rationally explicable in the context of state interests, the external environment and perceived associated demands. Evaluations and conclusions as to a state's neutrality based on a particular definition will always be questionable, because the concept is fundamentally essentially contested. What is clear is that Ireland's practice of neutrality was arguably as clear-cut, legally circumspect, and sufficiently deterring, credible, recognised and respected, as that of the other neutral European states during the Second World War, if not more so. As a result, the current elite strategy to discredit Irish neutrality through incomplete comparative or ideological analyses of the practice of Irish neutrality, and to claim on the basis of such analyses that the public has 'illusions' about the nature of Irish neutrality 184 during the Second World War is undermined. Neutrality is a complex policy, in theory and in practice, and tends to be universally hated by all sides. The Americans waged an unscrupulous campaign in the press against Irish neutrality, 185 as did the British. As Frank Aiken, the Irish Minister for the Coordination of Defensive Measures, put it in January 1940: neutrality is not like a simple mathematical formula which has only to be announced and demonstrated in order to be believed and respected…instead of earning the respect and goodwill of both belligerents it is regarded by both with hatred and contempt, 'He who is not with me is against me'. In the modern total warfare it is not a condition of peace with both belligerents, but rather a condition of limited warfare with both… 186 In these perennial circumstances, it will always be difficult to achieve an 'unbiased' analysis of Ireland's neutrality.
